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ALTERNATIVES TO THE RIGHT TO STRIKE FOR PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES: DO THEY ADEQUATELY IMPLEMENT
FLORIDA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COLLECTIVELY
BARGAIN?
ALAINE S. WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION
Public employees in Florida possess a constitutional right that
fellow public workers in neighboring states unfortunately do not
share-a right to collectively bargain, expressed in the declaration
of rights of the Florida Constitution.' Although drafters of that pro-
vision continue ten years later to debate whether such a right was
intended to extend to public employment,2 the Florida Supreme
Court declared the existence of the right in 19693 and in 1972 prod-
ded the legislature to implement it.'
Public sector collective bargaining is different from the bargain-
ing that occurs in the private sector. Private employees have a
statutory right to strike.' Public employees, on the other hand, gen-
erally are prohibited from striking.' In Florida, the constitutional
* B.F.A. 1971, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1979, Florida State University College of Law;
LL.M. expected 1980, Columbia University School of Law.
1. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
2. In an address to the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission, Chesterfield Smith, a
member of the 1965 Constitution Revision Commission, expressed his belief that the drafts-
men of FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 did not intend it to apply to public employees. Charles Harris,
a fellow 1965 revision commission member, expressed his belief that the right of public
employees to collectively bargain was clearly intended by the 1965 revision commission.
Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 38 (July 6, 1977); Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings
36-37 (July 7, 1977). See also McGuire, Public Employee Collective Bargaining in Flor-
ida-Past, Present and Future, 1 FA. ST. U.L. REv. 26, 42-44 n.64 (1973).
3. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969). "[Wlith
the exception of the right to strike, public employees have the same rights of collective
bargaining as are granted private employees by Section 6." Id. at 905 (footnote omitted).
4. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972). The
teachers union filed an original petition for a writ of mandamus requesting the supreme court
"to compel the Legislature .. .to enact standards or guidelines regulating the right of
collective bargaining by public employees of this state .... " Id. at 685. The court did not
grant the petition, ruling that its intervention would be premature but warning the legislature
that if it failed to take action within a reasonable period of time the court would develop
collective bargaining guidelines. In 1974 the Florida Legislature enacted legislation imple-
menting article I, section 6. Ch. 74-100, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§
447.201-609 (1977)).
5. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976):
"Nothing in this subchapter. . . shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications of that
right."
6. Only eight states allow a limited right to strike: ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1978); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 89-12 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64(1), (7) (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 59-1603 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (precursor construed in State v. Public Employees
Craft Council, 529 P.2d 785 (Mont. 1974)); OR. Rzv. STAT. § 243.726 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
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provision granting public employees the right to collectively bargain
specifically proscribes striking.7 Though strikes in the private sector
are viewed with trepidation by both management and labor, the
threat of a strike is often the only factor compelling the parties to
bargain in good faith.8
In the absence of a right to strike, how can public sector collective
bargaining be successful? What does "collective bargaining" really
mean, and what must it entail to really work? A number of states
have decided that an alternative to the strike threat must be avail-
able. The alternative that has captured the attention of most law-
makers is compulsory arbitration-a procedure, triggered when con-
tract negotiations break down, requiring management and labor to
submit their positions to an arbitrator who then renders a decision
binding upon both parties.
Collective bargaining for public employees has not been popularly
embraced in Florida. The legislature begrudgingly implemented the
constitutional right, but did not give public employees a mechanism
to exert significant pressure upon recalcitrant employers; the power
to decide what the contract will provide lies ultimately with the
public employer. This has diminished the effectiveness of collective
bargaining and has impaired public employees' exercise of this im-
portant constitutional right.
The fifth anniversary of the passage of the Florida act affords an
opportunity to examine public sector bargaining in general, to re-
view the implementation and the effectiveness of the Florida
scheme in particular, and to propose alternatives for the resolution
of contract negotiation deadlocks.
IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Collective bargaining for public employees is a relatively new area
in labor law. Although government employees began joining unions
in the 1830's, the unions were relatively docile associations with few
members.' In 1936 the first national public employees union-the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME)-was founded.'" It was not, however, until the 1960's
tit. 43, § 1101.2201 (Purdon Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.77 (West Supp. 1979).
7. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
8. See generally Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HAjv.
L. REv. 459 (1971); Kaden, The Potential of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
81 YALE L.J. 772, 781 (1972).
9. See Project, Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 887, 894-95 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Collective Bargaining and Politics].
10. Id. at 915-16 n.151.
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that public employee unions attained sufficient membership to be
considered politically important."
Today collective bargaining for public employees has become the
rule rather than the exception. Approximately three-fourths of the
states have enacted legislation permitting some form of collective
bargaining. 2 Although the laws differ in specifics, the right to strike
is generally prohibited, either by statute or by case law. 3 Because
public employees cannot rely on strikes as a tool in negotiations with
their employers, they must be provided with other avenues to break
deadlocks if public sector collective bargaining is to have any mean-
ing. Basically, there are three impasse resolution mechanisms used
in public sector collective bargaining: mediation, factfinding, and
arbitration.
Mediation generally involves an outside party who is brought in
to assist the parties in voluntarily agreeing to a settlement after a
contract negotiation impasse has arisen. Although the mediator pri-
marily serves as a neutral referee, he generally is allowed to formu-
late and propose his own suggestions for terminating the dispute.
Mediation is viewed merely as an initial impasse mechanism, and
additional procedures are usually available in the event of its fail-
ure. A majority of states providing for public employee collective
bargaining include provisions for mediation. 4
Undoubtedly the most widely prescribed impasse resolution tech-
nique is factfinding. 15 Factfinding involves an outside party, or
panel, who sits as a referee to determine the positions of the public
employees and the public employer, and who then issues a written
report finding facts and making recommendations for an equitable
settlement. The report is then delivered to the legislative body
charged with administering the public employer for a final disposi-
tion; it is concurrently made public in most of these states to put
pressure on all parties for a fair resolution."
The last mechanism for impasse resolution is arbitration, the
process resulting from a joint decision by the employer and the
union to submit specific issues to a third party for a resolution the
11. Id. at 896.
12. See Summary of State Labor Laws, 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 501 (Mar. 14,
1977).
13. See generally ABA Committee Report on State Labor Law, 61 Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP.
(BNA) 201, 216 (Sept. 11, 1978).
14. The majority of jurisdictions studied had a provision for factfinding or arbitration
following mediation. See H. TANIMOTO, GUIDE TO STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC SECTOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: IMPASSE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 13, 97 table 1 (Univ. of Haw. Indus.
Rel. Center 1973).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 15-17.
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parties are bound to accept. There are two broad categories of arbi-
tration. The first, voluntary interest arbitration, usually arises in
commercial contract situations and involves a voluntary agreement
by the parties to submit to arbitration in the event of a contract
dispute. 7 The second category, with which this article is directly
concerned, is compulsory interest arbitration, whereby the parties
are statutorily mandated to submit to arbitration upon the occurr-
ence of a certain event, usually exhaustion of other impasse resolu-
tion mechanisms. Where arbitration has been adopted, it will most
likely be compulsory for only the more "essential" public employ-
ees, such as police and firefighters.'8 It is currently mandated in
various forms in nineteen states. 9 In either category of arbitration,
the arbitrator's decision is binding on both parties.
THE FLORIDA SCHEME
Until recently, the Florida Constitution made no provision for
collective bargaining for any employees, public or private. Then, in
1968, article I, section 6 of the constitution was revised, apparently
to afford public employees the right to bargain collectively:
Right to work.-The right of persons to work shall not be denied
or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any
17. Florida provides for voluntary interest arbitration in FLA. STAT. ch. 682 (1977). Volun-
tary interest arbitration is also statutorily authorized in three other states: HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 89-11(b)(3) (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-4-11(c) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 243.706(2) (1977).
18. McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution
of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192, 1195 (1972).
19. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972) (for essential state workers, including policemen,
firefighters, correctional employees and hospital employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-472, -473c,
-474 (Supp. 1979) (municipal employees); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(d) (Supp. 1978) (firefight-
ers); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West 1978) (all public employees); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23-890 (West Supp. 1979) (municipal transit employees); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 965(4)
(Supp. 1977) (municipal employees and teachers), § 979-D(4) (Supp. 1978) (state employees),
§ 1026(4) (Supp. 1978) (university employees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 4 (West
Supp. 1979) (police and firefighters); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-.244 (1978) (local
police, firefighters, and emergency service personnel); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.69 (West Supp.
1978) (essential public employees); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801 to 838 (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(government employees); NEv. REv. STAT. § 288.200 (1977) (local government employees), §
288.215 (1977) (firefighters); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16 (West Supp. 1978) (police and
firefighters); N.Y. CiV. SERV. LAW § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (local police and firefight-
ers); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 243.742-.762 (1977) (police, firefighters, and guards at correctional
facilities and mental hospitals); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.4-.7 (police and firefighters),
§ 1101.805 (correctional officers and court employees) (Purdon Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-9.1-1 to .4-19 (firefighters, police, teachers, and municipal employees), § 36-11-9 (state
employees) (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.450-.470 (Supp. 1979) (uniformed
personnel); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (West Supp. 1978) (police and firefighters), § 111.70(4)
(West Supp. 1978) (municipal employees, applicable in 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 27-10-105 (1977)
(firefighters).
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labor union or labor organization. The right of employees, by and
through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be
denied or abridged. Public employees shall not have the right to
strike. 0
This section was interpreted one year later, in Dade County
Classroom Teachers' Association v. Ryan, as guaranteeing public
employees the right to collectively bargain.2' Despite this clear
statement from the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida Legislature
failed between 1968 and 1973 to implement this right by legislation.
In 1972 the supreme court stepped into the void and warned the
legislature that if it did not adopt implementing legislation, the
court would be forced to enact collective bargaining guidelines by
judicial decree. 22 The court reiterated that the right of public em-
ployees to collectively bargain is a constitutionally protected right,
stating:
It is a right which should be exercised in accordance with appropri-
ate guidelines in order to make sure that there may be no denial
of the right and, at the same time, that the prohibition against
strikes by public employees will not be violated, either directly or
indirectly, and with appropriate penalties for doing so. 2 3
In 1974, five years after the effective date of the constitutional
revision, the legislature enacted chapter 447 of the Florida Statutes,
finally implementing public employees' right to collective bargain-
ing.24 With this legislation, Florida became the first state in the
South to adopt a comprehensive labor relations act for public em-
ployees.2 5
The Florida impasse resolution scheme allows an impasse to be
declared by either party after a reasonable period of negotiation.
Negotiations are carried out between the chief executive officer of
20. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis supplied).
21. 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969). Public employees' constitutional right to collective bargain-
ing has since been recognized by all four Florida district courts of appeal. See District 57,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 352 So. 2d 62, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977); Pinellas County Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 347
So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); School Bd. v. Public Employees Relations
Comm'n, 330 So. 2d 770, 775 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 336 So. 2d 603 (Fla.
1976); City of Coral Gables v. Coral Gables Employees Ass'n, 289 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 301 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1974).
22. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686-88 (Fla.
1972).
23. Id. at 687 (emphasis supplied by the court).
24. Ch. 74-100, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 447.201-.609 (1977)).
25. McHugh, The Florida Experience in Public Employee Collective Bargaining, 1974-
1978: Bellwether for the South, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 263, 264 (1978).
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the governmental entity and the bargaining agent for the employee
organization. 2 The declaration of impasse must be in writing and
is submitted to the other party and the Public Employees Relations
Commission (PERC) .27 The parties may engage in permissive me-
diation to resolve the impasse, or they can proceed immediately to
the factfinding phase. 28 A factfinder, called a special master, ap-
pointed by PERC or mutually agreed upon by the parties, is author-
ized to hold hearings, determine facts, and render a decision on
unresolved contract issues.29 Rules, promulgated by PERC, require
the parties to stipulate the issues in dispute prior to submitting the
impasse to a special master.3 1
Criteria the special master must consider in arriving at his recom-
mended decision include salary comparisons between similar pri-
vate sector employees and comparably sized public employers, the
public interest and availability of funds, and a comparison of the
peculiarities of employment, such as hazards, physical, educational,
or intellectual qualifications, training and skills, retirement plans,
sick leave, and job security.3'
The special master submits his report, consisting of a finding of
facts delineating the unresolved issues and a recommended deci-
sion, to PERC fifteen days after the hearing. PERC is required to
transmit the recommended decision to both parties within five days
of receipt. The recommended decision is subject to further negotia-
tions by the parties and is deemed approved by both parties unless
a written rejection specifying the causes therefor is filed with PERC
and the other party within twenty days of receipt of the decision."
The next step in the impasse resolution scheme involves the legis-
lative body of the governmental entity.33 Within ten days of rejec-
tion of the recommended decision, the chief executive officer and
the bafrgaining agent each submit their recommendations for set-
tling the impasse to each other and the legislative body. The legisla-
tive body conducts a public hearing wherein both parties are re-
quired to explain their positions on the special master's recom-
26. FLA. STAT. § 447.309 (1977).
27. Id. § 447.403(1).
28. Id. § 447.403(1), (2).
29. Id. § 447.403(3). The special master also has access to any pertinent records (§
447.409) and has the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths (§ 447.403(3)). Costs
incurred during the process are to be shared equally by the parties (§ 447.407).
30. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 8H-5.09.
31. FLA. STAT. § 447.405 (1977).
32. Id. § 447.403(3).
33. Some examples of legislative bodies (with their respective chief executive officers) are
boards of county commissioners (county executive), district school boards (county school
superintendent), and the state legislature (chancellor of the university system). See McHugh,
supra note 25, at 277-81.
PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
mended decision.3' The legislative body is then authorized to take
"such action as it deems to be in the public interest, including the
interest of the public employees involved.
35
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHAPTER 447
Drawing any conclusions about the effectiveness of the Florida
impasse resolution scheme is difficult because of the lack of empiri-
cal data on its use. PERC has gathered information on certain
phases of the procedure, but it is of limited significance because
comparison data are inadequate. For example, annual figures are
available on how often factfinding by a special master occurred, but
the total number of contracts negotiated in that same year is not
available; thus, it is impossible to determine what percentage of
negotiations result in impasse and are submitted to factfinding.
Although PERC has promulgated a rule requiring the parties to file
a notice of negotiation with it when negotiations are begun, 6 the
rule is not strictly enforced.37
In any event, the data PERC has collected on the use of special
masters indicate that a special master was used more often in 1978
than in previous years and that the percentage of special masters'
reports being accepted by both parties has increased.3 1
34. FiA. STAT. § 447.403(4) (1977).
35. Id. § 447.403(4)(d).
36. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 8H-5.03.
37. Interview with Millie Seay, Administrative Assistant to Chairman of PERC, Tallahas-
see, Florida (Mar. 7, 1979). Ms. Seay indicated that most parties felt that because the
requirement was not specified in chapter 447, it was not necessary to comply. The rule is
promulgated pursuant to a general grant of authority under § 447.207(1). Although there is
some dispute as to what types of rules can be promulgated pursuant to such a grant, the rule
in question would seem to be a rule "necessary and administratively feasible to carry out the
provisions" of chapter 447 and should be upheld in a challenge. FIA. STAT. § 447.207(1) (1977).
The First District Couit of Appeal has ruled that regulations promulgated under a general
rulemaking power "will be sustained so long as they are reasonably related to the purposes
of the enabling legislation, and are not arbitrary or capricious." Florida Beverage Corp. v.
Wynne, 306 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
A possible method to force compliance with this rule would be for PERC or a substantially
interested person to file a petition for enforcement pursuant to the Florida Administrative
Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. § 120.69 (1977).
38. W. McHugh, Public Labor Law Research Project (1977) (unpublished study at Florida
State University College of Law; updated in 1979).
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USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS IN FLORIDA
1975 1976 1977 1978
Total Number of
special master
reports issued 27 25 12 40
Number of reports
accepted 3 3 2 13
Number of reports
rejected by employer 14 16 5 20
(Percent) (52 7V) (64'/) (42%) (50%)
Number of reports
rejected by union 3 1 1 4
(Percent) (11%) (4%) (8%) (10%)
Number of reports
rejected by both 7 5 4 3
(Percent) (26%) (20%) (33%) (8%)
Percent of reports
rejected 89 % 88% 83 % 68%
Percent of reports
accepted 11% 12% 17% 32%
The current chairman of PERC points to the declining rate of rejec-
tion and the concomitant rise in the acceptance rate of the special
master reports as an indication of success." Acceptance by both
parties, however, does not necessarily mean that the special master
report was accepted by the legislative body.4 O
39. Lecture by Leonard Carson, Chairman, Public Employees Relations Commission,
Tallahassee, Florida (Feb. 26, 1979). On the other hand, the two teacher unions, the Florida
Education Association/United (FEA) and the Florida Teaching Professionals-National Edu-
cation Association (FTP-NEA) agree that the present system is unfair to the employees but
disagree on which alternative would be preferable: the former advocates a right to strike
(interview with Bob Lee, President, FEA, Tallahassee, Florida (June 5, 1979)); the latter,
compulsory interest arbitration (interview with Tay Green, representing FTP-NEA, Talla-
hassee, Florida (Mar. 3,_1979)).
40. Although current, comprehensive evidence that legislative bodies frequently reject
special masters' reports is unavailable, a recent study by Professor William McHugh of
Florida State University College of Law indicates that this is, in fact, quite a problem with
chapter 447. According to this study, the legislative body rejected 78% of all special masters'
reports in Florida in 1975, 84% in 1976, and 75% in 1977. W. McHugh, Public Labor Law
Research Project (1977) (unpublished study at Florida State University College of Law). See
also Note, Prohibiting Binding Arbitration: The Proposed Change in Article I, Section 6, 6
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1003, 1007 (1978).
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Irrespective of the lack of data, the inadequacy of the Florida
scheme relative to the public employee is clear, for the inescapable
result of granting one of the parties-namely, the legislative
body-the power to unilaterally declare the ultimate terms of the
contract is to render the "bargaining" illusory. One commentator,
addressing the whole scheme generally and the education system
specifically, recently noted:
Impartiality is nearly impossible when the school board is both the
public employer (with responsibility for negotiating the contract)
and the legislative body (with ultimate authority for resolving con-
tract disputes). Nothing undermines the validity of factfinding in
the school districts more than the fact that the school boards wear
two hats.4
A recent negotiation involving the state university system clearly
demonstrates this problem. The bargaining agent for the faculty of
the state university system entered into negotiations with the Board
of Regents on monetary issues. An impasse was declared and the
parties submitted to factfinding. The special master issued a recom-
mended decision which was ultimately accepted by both parties.
The following month, the Florida Legislature passed a general ap-
propriations act which underfunded the collective bargaining agree-
ment.4
2
The faculty union sued the Board of Regents,4 3 notwithstanding
a provision of the public employee relations law which states that
failure by the legislature to appropriate adequate monies to fund the
special master's recommendation will not constitute an unfair labor
practice, and which requires that the chief executive officer admin-
ister the contract on the basis of amounts appropriated.44 The union
asserted that sufficient monies were available and that the Board
had deviated from the essential requirements of law by refusing to
allocate the funds to meet the commitments in the negotiated con-
tract. The court noted that the Board of Regents had properly re-
quested that sufficient funds be appropriated, but that the legisla-
ture had failed to heed the request. Accordingly, relying on the
statutory provision absolving the employer from responsibility for
the legislature's failure to provide sufficient funding, the court ruled
in favor of the employer.
41. McHugh, supra note 25, at 319. See also H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS
AND THE CITIES 170-77 (1971); McKelvey, Fact Finding in Public Employment Disputes:
Promise or Illusion?, 22 INDUS. & LAS. REL. Rav. 528, 530-31, 542 (1969).
42. Ch. 77-465, 1977 Fla. Laws 1899, 1900 (uncodified appropriations bill).
43. United Faculty v. Board of Regents, 365 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
44. FLA. STAT. § 447.309(2) (1977).
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The collective bargaining agreement to which the petitioner is a
party did not divest the Legislature of its constitutional powers in
the appropriation of public monies. It did not reconstitute the
exercise of legislative discretion a simple ministerial function. The
agreement subsumed the Legislature's appropriations authority. It
depended, as the parties knew full well from the outset, upon an
appropriation in the amount requested, failing which the agree-
ment was to be administered within the appropriation made.15
The one-sided nature of the Florida collective bargaining process,
together with the prohibition on public employee strikes, leaves
little leverage in the hands of the worker over terms and conditions
of employment. Essentially, Florida law requires only that the pub-
lic employer meet and confer in good faith; a recalcitrant employer
who has complied with the statutory requisites need accept no posi-
tion with which he does not agree.4" Consequently, public employees
can do nothing to resolve bargaining disputes except to exert politi-
cal pressure upon elected members of the legislative body who make
the ultimate decision on the final contract. Unfortunately, such
pressure usually will have insignificant effect, for although public
employee unions wield great power in certain areas of the United
States, the South (and particularly Florida)47 is largely antiunion
and has been fairly immune to this power;48 a local legislator may
occasionally regret voting for a final contract that will disaffect
constituents who are public employees, but in all likelihood the
majority of his constituents are hostile to unions and will support
his vote.
Under the present scheme, the public employer's position is
weighted so heavily that collective bargaining is rendered illusory.
This being so, the present Florida statutory scheme should be de-
clared unconstitutional as a meaningless implementation of public
employees' constitutional right to collectively bargain. Initially,
however, a basic question must be resolved: What does the right to
collectively bargain entail?
This question has not been answered in Florida. The First District
Court of Appeal, however, commenting on the prohibition against
strikes, stated that the prohibition was not intended to "give public
employers a power advantage over their employees in contract nego-
tiations. Strikes are prohibited to protect the public, not to circum-
45. United Faculty v. Board of Regents, 365 So. 2d 1073, 1078-79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
46. But see School Board v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 350 So. 2d 819 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
47. See Miami Herald, Mar. 8, 1979, § A, at 6, col. 1.
48. See Collective Bargaining and Politics, supra note 9, at 887.
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vent the rights of public employees to meaningful collective bar-
gaining with their employer."49 A similar response should result if
the courts are challenged to comment on Florida's meaningless im-
passe resolution scheme.
It is important to remember that it is a constitutional, rather than
a statutory, right which is at issue. The people of Florida manifested
their high regard for collective bargaining by placing it in the consti-
tution in 1968. Legislative implementation of constitutional rights
must be closely scrutinized by the courts. As the Florida Supreme
Court said:
The judiciary is in a lofty sense the guardian of the law of the land
and the Constitution is the highest law. A constitution would be a
meaningless instrument without some responsible agency of gov-
ernment having authority to enforce it. . . .When the people have
spoken through their organic law concerning their basic rights, it
is primarily the duty of the legislative body to provide the ways
and means of enforcing such rights; however, in the absence of
appropriate legislative action, it is the responsibility of the courts
to do so 0 I
If the legislature has enacted legislation which inadequately im-
plements and protects the constitutional right to collectively bar-
gain, the judiciary should be bold in declaring the law unconstitu-
tional.5' Thereafter, the legislature would be compelled to enact
meaningful collective bargaining-in other words, to institute com-
pulsory interest arbitration.
One reason for implementing compulsory interest arbitration is
because without it "collective bargaining" in Florida lacks any
49. School Board v. Public Employee Relations Comm'n, 350 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
50. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla.
1972); cf. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1, 225 N.W.2d 658
(Wis.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 821, opinions of individual justices in chambers, 423 U.S. 1301
(1975) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 482, cert. denied, 427
U.S. 904 (1976). (By statute, public employees were not allowed to strike. Police and firefight-
ers, however, had a right to compulsory arbitration, while teachers did not. In a suit brought
by the teachers, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that there was a rational basis for the
classification and that the teachers had not been deprived of equal protection of the laws.
Note, however, an important factor distinguishing the Florida situation from that in Wiscon-
sin: Florida's right to collective bargaining is constitutional, as opposed to statutory, and as
such is subject to much stricter judicial scrutiny than that involved with the rational basis
test.)
51. Direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court would be available because the circuit
court in which the action was commenced would be construing a provision of the state
constitution. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1). There should be, consequently, a definitive resolu-
tion of the issue.
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meaning whatsoever. Another substantial and more positive reason
•to do so is because interest arbitration is a rational alternative to
strikes.5
Private employees have a right to strike, a right believed to be
significant for the maintenance of labor peace53 and essential to
meaningful bargaining." Most public employees in this country
have a right to collectively bargain, but because the majority of
jurisdictions prohibit strikes, the right has been more accurately
described as "collective begging." In a 1972 decision upholding the
sentences of a group of striking teachers, a New Jersey court noted
that:
Jailing teachers is not the answer to school strikes .... Public
employees have the right to bargain collectively as to the terms
and conditions of their employment but cannot do so on equal
terms with their employment unit since they have no means of
negotiating from a position of strength. If the present policy pro-
hibiting strikes by public employees is to be continued, machinery
for the compulsory settlement of deadlocked labor disputes involv-
ing public employees should be established. 5
With an effective, fair method of settling contract negotiation dis-
putes, as opposed to the one-sided factfinding system in Florida,
public employee strikes, besides being illegal, would also occur less
often."
52. See Anderson, MacDonald, & O'Reilly, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collec-
tive Bargaining-An Examination of Compulsory Interest Arbitration in New York, 51 ST.
JOHNS L. Rxv. 453, 455 (1977).
53. Public employees' right to compulsory arbitration has also been held to be significant
to the maintenance of labor peace. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211
(1964).
54. See generally Bernstein, supra note 8; Kaden, supra note 8.
It is interesting to note that while the right to strike possessed by private employees has
been determined to be a "mandatory" subject of bargaining (Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306
(1948)), meaning that the employer and union must bargain in good faith regarding strike
rights (Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 8(a)(5), (d), 29 U.S.C. §§
158(a)(5), (d) (1976)), interest arbitration clauses have been declared to be "nonmandatory"
subjects of bargaining-i.e., either of the parties can propose a nonmandatory subject, but
that party cannot insist to the point of impasse that it be discussed or considered (Massachu-
setts Nurses Ass'n, 225 N.L.R.B. 678, 679 (1976); Greensboro Printing Pressmen & Assistants'
Local 319, 222 N.L.R.B. 893, 896 (1976); Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Local
252, 219 N.L.R.B. 268, 279 (1975)).
55. In re Newark Teachers Local 481, 118 N.J. Super. 215, 222 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1972).
56. But see Hortonville Educ. Ass'n v. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1, 225 N.W.2d
658 (Wis.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 821 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 482, cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976) (teachers' claim that interest arbitration was a necessary, rational
alternative to strikes was dismissed summarily).
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In addition, negotiations should be more fruitful when some form
of threat-namely, forced arbitration-is present. 7 If the public
employer in Florida were subject to outside arbitration in the event
contract negotiations broke down, he probably would be more en-
thusiastic about good faith bargaining. The threat of arbitration
would have the desired effect of encouraging bargaining and would
motivate the parties to voluntarily agree to the contract. Although
some argue that arbitration is not a substitute for strikes but rather
a substitute for bargaining,18 statistics compiled under the New
York arbitration law indicate that there is no evidence that compul-
sory interest arbitration has chilled collective bargaining. 59 Instead,
factors such as hostility between union and management represent-
atives, political pressure tactics by the union, and the use of outside
negotiators were more likely to account for an impasse than the
availability of arbitration machinery. 0
ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
The most popular argument against compulsory interest arbitra-
tion is that it is undemocratic to give a nonelected, unaccountable,
outside arbitrator the power to commit public funds.6 In debate
before the 1978 Florida Constitution Revision Commission, propo-
nents of the prohibition of compulsory interest arbitration asserted
that such arbitration "placed in the hands of private persons not
answerable to the voters the ultimate authority to set taxes, to force
57. See Kaden, supra note 8, at 780-81.
58. See W. WiRTz, LABOR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 46-57 (1964); McAvoy, supra note 18,
at 1209.
59. See Anderson, MacDonald, & O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 508.
Concern about the potential chilling effect arbitration may have on negotiation prompted
Massachusetts to establish a joint labor-management committee to oversee firefighter and
police negotiations. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 4A (West Supp. 1979) (added by 1977
Mass. Acts ch. 730, § 1). Composed of representatives from each of the parties and a neutral
chairman, the committee oversees negotiations to ensure true, good faith bargaining. The
system has enjoyed widespread acceptance in Massachusetts. See Mass. Creates Joint Labor-
Management Panel to Screen Police-Fire Arbitrations, 739 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 16,
20 (Dec. 19, 1977).
It has often been argued that compulsory arbitration has not eliminated strikes. See H.
WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 41, at 177. This, however, is unfounded, for there has
been a noticeable absence of strikes by groups covered by arbitration mechanisms. P. FEUILLE,
FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION: CONCEPTS, DEVELOPMENTS, AND TECHNIQUES 10 (Public Employee
Relations Library No. 50, 1975).
60. See Anderson, MacDonald, & O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 476.
A final argument favoring compulsory interest arbitration is the certainty and finality of
the award. Although most statutes allow an appeal from an arbitration award, the scope of
review is generally limited, employing an "arbitrary and capricious" or a "substantial evi-
dence" test. See Note, Compulsory Arbitration: The Scope of Judicial Review, 51 ST. JOHNS
L REV. 604, 620 (1977).
61. See McAvoy, supra note 18, at 1208.
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elected officials to reduce services or reallocate spending priorities
in the means they believe to be in the best interest of the public.""2
This argument presupposes that arbitral awards are more gener-
ous than voluntary agreements or settlements imposed by the pub-
lic employer. A recent study of the New York arbitration statute
conducted by the New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations at Cornell University found that the difference between
arbitral awards and negotiated settlements was statistically insig-
nificant, and that, in fact, arbitral awards were somewhat lower
than negotiated settlements . 3
The argument also assumes that the arbitrator will be unrespon-
sive to the fiscal condition of the public employer. According to
many commentators, however, that assumption is unwarranted. 4
Furthermore, the public employer's ability to pay can be included
as a criterion to be considered by the arbitrator in reaching a deci-
sion. Massachusetts, for example, recently amended its interest ar-
bitration law to specify five factors to be considered by the arbitra-
tor in determining the financial ability of a municipality to meetthe
costs of an award. 5 Among those factors are a municipality's reim-
bursements and assessments, its bond indebtedness, and the aver-
age per capita property tax burden.
The constitutional argument most often asserted against compul-
sory interest arbitration is that the enabling statute constitutes an
unlawful delegation of legislative authority. The basic premise un-
derlying the nondelegation doctrine is that as a result of the require-
ments of separation of powers and political accountability the legis-
lature may not delegate its power.6 Although the doctrine has been
eroded entirely under federal law, 7 it is still strong in Florida. 8
Even in Florida, however, practical necessity dictates that the
legislature delegate some of its power to the other branches. There-
fore, a delegation generally will be upheld if the court determines
that adequate standards have been provided to restrict the discre-
62. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 59 (Dec. 9, 1977).
63. See Anderson, MacDonald, & O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 473-77.
64. See, e.g., id. at 507.
65. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 4 (West Supp. 1979) (added by 1977 Mass. Acts
ch. 347, § 2).
66. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01-16 (1958 & Supp.
1965).
67. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397-400 (1940); K. DAVIS,
supra note 66, at § 2.01 (1958).
68. See Department of Business Regulation v. National Manufactured Housing Fed'n,
Inc., No. 53-065, 17 FLA. L.W. 182 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 1979); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways,
Nos. 52,251, 52,252, 45 FiA. L.W. 546 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 22, 1978), clarified, 7 F.A. L.W. 85 (Sup.
Ct. Feb. 15, 1979).
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tion of the decisionmaker and to prevent encroachment upon the
domain of another governmental branch."
The majority of enabling statutes authorizing compulsory interest
arbitration have withstood unlawful delegation challenges.7 As long
as the court was satisfied that adequate standards were provided,
the statutes were upheld. The New York Court of Appeals, in up-
holding the New York enabling statute, stated that "there is no
constitutional prohibition against the legislative delegation of
power, with reasonable safeguards and standards, to an agency or
commission established to administer an enactment."'" Although
some enabling statutes have been found to constitute unlawful dele-
gations, it is invariably because a controlling constitutional provi-
sion exists which prohibits such delegations."
A properly drafted statute, specifying the guidelines to which the
arbitrator should adhere in making decisions, should withstand a
constitutional challenge in Florida. A recent Florida case held that
the nondelegation doctrine required that legislative programs be
administered "pursuant to some minimal standards and guidelines
ascertainable by reference to the enactment establishing the pro-
gram. 7 3 Enumerating specific factors that the arbitrator must con-
sider in reaching his decision should be sufficient to withstand an
unlawful delegation challenge. Limiting the arbitrator's discretion
by requiring final offer arbitration might also be effective.74
69. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 66.
70. See City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Town of
Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arb., 352 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1976); Dearborn Fire
Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975); School Dist. of Seward
Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 199 N.W.2d 752 (Neb. 1972); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 332
N.E.2d 290 (N.Y. 1975); Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1969); City of Warwick v.
Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969); City of Spokane v. Spokane
Police Guild, 553 P.2d 1316 (Wash. 1976); State ex rel Fire Fighters Local 946 v. City of
Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). Contra City of Aurora v. Aurora Firefighters' Protective
Ass'n, 566 P.2d 1356 (Colo. 1977); Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 553 P.2d 790 (Colo.
1976); City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 1975);
City of Kingsville v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2390, 568 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1978); Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).
71. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 332 N.E.2d 290, 293 (N.Y. 1975).
72. See Salt Lake City v. International Assn of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977)
(controlling constitutional provision: "The Legislature shall not delegate to any special com-
mission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with
any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise,
to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal functions." UTAH CONST.
art. VI, § 28). See also Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 553 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1976); City
of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 1975); City of
Kingsville v. International Ass'n of Firefighters Local 2390, 568 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Ct. App.
1978).
73. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
74. See text accompanying notes 87-90 infra.
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Whether an arbitrator's decision can bind a state legislature is an
issue rarely raised in discussions of compulsory interest arbitration,
probably because compulsory interest arbitration statutes apply
primarily to police officers and firefighters-local government em-
ployees. Local governments have no inherent powers to govern; they
have only those powers which are delegated by the constitution and
by general and special laws.75 If the legislature enacts a general law
requiring bargaining impasses to be submitted to compulsory inter-
est arbitration, local governmental entities would be forced to com-
ply with the law.
But where the subject of the legislation is state, rather than local,
public employees, a serious problem arises. It is well established in
Florida that one legislature cannot bind its successors.76 Therefore,
the enactment of compulsory arbitration legislation by a legislature
in one year would not bind an unwilling legislature in future years.
Precisely what impact this will have on compulsory arbitration leg-
islation is speculative at best, but the following hypothetical will
bring the problem into focus. Hypothesize an arbitral award result-
ing from an impasse between the state university faculty and the
Board of Regents which grants the faculty a seven percent pay in-
crease. The Board of Regents and the faculty are bound by the
award, but they must go to the legislature for an appropriation to
fund it. The legislature refuses to appropriate sufficient funds, as-
serting that a five percent increase is more than adequate. The
"binding" quality of the arbitrator's award clearly has lost its effec-
tiveness. 7
Two possible solutions to this problem come to mind. One solu-
75. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1(f), (g), 2(b); art. IX, § 4(b).
76. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. St. Johns Ry., 16 Fla. 531 (1878). See
also Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976);
Straughn v. Camp, 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 891 (1975).
The issue usually arises in the context of tax exemptions granted by one legislature being
revoked by a subsequent legislature. See Note, Ad Valorem Taxation of Leasehold Interests
in Governmentally Owned Property, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1085 (1978). These revocations are
uniformly upheld by the Florida Supreme Court.
77. Whether affirmative action must be, taken by a legislative body to amend or repeal
the law in question or whether the law can be merely ignored is unclear. The tax cases referred
to supra note 76, involved repeals of previously granted exemptions. Williams v. Jones, 326
So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976); Straughn v. Camp, 293 So. 2d
689 (Fla. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 891 (1975). For an example of the legislature
having the authority to simply ignore a statute, see [1955-1956] FLA. Arr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL
REP. No. 055-82, 109, 110 wherein the attorney general issued an opinion allowing the legisla-
ture to overrule by implication a statute providing a four-year limitation on claims bills. (The
legislative body in question had approved payment for an action arising 15 years earlier.)
Also, the legislature often refuses to appropriate funds for programs apparently required by
statute. Regardless of which action is taken, the legislature does have the authority to ignore
its own previous edicts.
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tion would be to promote the concept that a moral obligation ex-
isted-that although a future legislature could not be bound, it
would have an obligation to acquiesce in the award and to appropri-
ate sufficient funds. Moral obligation generally arises in the context
of "moral obligation bonds," a form of revenue bond in which the
state does not pledge its full faith and credit but somehow becomes
morally obligated." Although Florida has not officially authorized
moral obligation bonds, the concept of a lurking moral obligation
has been considered, but not adopted, by the Florida Supreme
Court."
The other solution would be to include a clause in the compulsory
interest arbitration statute specifying that arbitral awards requiring
state legislative action would not be effective without such action.
Of the nineteen states that have enacted compulsory interest arbi-
tration statutes, only four states include all state employees in the
coverage." Of those four, two states, Maine8' and Rhode Island,82
provide that awards involving financial benefits are only advisory
upon the state legislative body. Presumably, the advisory nature of
these awards is mandated by the rule that future legislatures cannot
be bound.
TYPES OF COMPULSORY INTEREST ARBITRATION
After the courts, and possibly the legislature, recognize that
collective bargaining in Florida has not been adequately imple-
mented, some action must be taken to amend chapter 447 to include
compulsory interest arbitration provisions. Three forms of compul-
sory interest arbitration have been developed: conventional, final
offer, and issue-by-issue. Although conventional arbitration is pres-
ently the most widely used, final offer and issue-by-issue arbitration
are growing in acceptance. An understanding of the mechanics of
each, as well as an appreciation of its effectiveness, is necessary to
determine which path Florida should follow.
Conventional arbitration allows the arbitrator (or arbitration
panel) to resolve disputes according to his best judgment, the only
78. Moral obligations bonds are often used to partially fund state operated authorities and
housing finance agencies. See generally Quirk & Wein, A Short Constitutional History of
Entities Commonly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 521, 552-61 (1971).
79. See State v. Putnam County Dev. Auth., 249 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971); Nohrr v. Brevard
County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 309, 311 (Fla. 1971).
80. IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (West 1978); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 26 §§ 965(4), 979-D(4),
1026(4) (Supp. 1978), NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801 to 838 (Cum. Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN LAWS
§§ 28-9.1-1 to .4-19, § 36-11-9 (Supp. 1978).
81. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26 § 979-D(4)(D) (Supp. 1978).
82. R.I. GEN LAWS § 36-11-9 (Supp. 1978).
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restraints being statutory criteria. The resolution, or award, is gen-
erally a compromise containing parts of both parties' positions.
3
The biggest advantage of conventional arbitration is that it allows
arbitrators the flexibility needed to fashion equitable awards." It
also simultaneously protects the interests of both the employer and
the union-the employer cannot unilaterally impose his terms on
the union if he is dissatisfied with the arbitral award, and the union
cannot summarily reject the award in an attempt to get one more
beneficial to its position.5
The most significant drawback of conventional arbitration is that
it tends to chill collective bargaining-neither party will truly bar-
gain in good faith because each fears it may give up more than
necessary prior to an impasse .8 It has long been thought that con-
ventional arbitration awards are a compromise of both parties' posi-
tions. Thus, if a compromise is likely to result, the union will
staunchly maintain during negotiations that it must have a ten
percent wage increase, and management will predictably maintain
that it can only give a three percent increase. The usual result is
that the arbitrator will compromise and award six percent.
Final offer arbitration is a procedure whereby each party simulta-
neously submits its last best offer to the arbitrator. The arbitrator
is limited to a choice of one of the offers in totality and may not
fashion a compromise award. Because the arbitrator is limited to
choosing the offer of either management or labor, both parties argu-
ably will engage in serious collective bargaining and their respective
final offers should be nearly identical. 7 This incentive to present the
most reasonable offer, for fear of losing everything if the opposition's
offer is adopted by the arbitrator, truly encourages good faith bar-
gaining.8 It also severely limits arbitral discretion. On the other
hand, it has the effect of tying the hands of the arbitrator and may
result in awards that are unsatisfactory to all parties." Furthermore,
arbitrators themselves have been particularly critical of final offer
83. E.g., N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 209(4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
84. See generally Anderson, MacDonald, & O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 494.
85. See P. FEUILLE, supra note 59, at 7.
86. Id. at 8.
87. E.g. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89.11(d) (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 9
(West Supp. 1979).
88. Zack, Final Offer Selection-Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 19 N.Y.L.F. 567, 573 (1974).
See generally Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 64 CALIF. L. REV.
678 (1976). The Governor of New York recently agreed to submit to last best offer arbitration
any impasse that may result during contract negotiations between the state and the union
representing state employees. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 2.
89. See Witney, Final-Offer Arbitration: The Indianapolis Experience, 96 (No.5)
MONTHLY LAa. REV. 20 (1973).
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selection, presumably because they are unable to fashion awards
which give something to both sides.90
Issue-by-issue arbitration allows the arbitrator or arbitration
panel to choose between the final offers of the parties on an issue-
by-issue basis. The arbitrator has the prerogative of considering
each issue on its merits and accepting the most reasonable offer.
The arbitrator, however, cannot refashion an offer on a particular
issue; he must accept the offer on the issue in its entirety.,' In this
respect, issue-by-issue arbitration is quite similar to conventional
arbitration, for the discretion granted the arbitrator in selecting
various issues from the proposals of both parties allows great flexi-
bility in molding a final award that seems equitable to everyone.
Besides the advantage of flexibility, issue-by-issue arbitration pro-
vides an opportunity for each party to influence directly the final
award, thereby producing the beneficial effect of allowing both par-
ties to feel they have won something. It also forces the parties to be
reasonable in their demands at the risk of losing an entire issue.92
It may, however, have a chilling effect on negotiations, because
the parties have little incentive to reach agreement on separate
issues. A study completed in 1975 indicated that jurisdictions with
issue arbitration were invoking arbitration more often than states
with final offer arbitration. 3 Moreover, it is becoming apparent that
issue arbitration does not induce parties to narrow their area of
disagreement as much as does final offer arbitration." Finally, di-
viding the parties' proposals into separate issues creates confusion
as to what, exactly, will constitute an issue. Recently, the Iowa
Supreme Court recognized the criticisms directed at issue-by-issue
arbitration and held that parties must submit their final offer on
particular issues by subject categories, rather than submit "any
word, clause, phrase, sentence or paragraph upon which parties"
may disagree. 5
For purposes of comparison, information from the nineteen states
providing compulsory arbitration has been assembled in a chart
appended hereto. 9 Analysis of this information indicates that most
states mandating compulsory. arbitration restrict it to police, fire-
90. See Long & Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration: "Sudden Death" in Eugene, 27 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 186, 202 n.44 (1974).
91. E.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.238 (1978).
92. See Note, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Sector: A Proposed Alternative, 26
ARB. J. 226, 232 (1971).
93. See P. FEUILLE, supra note 59, at 39.
94. Id.
95. West Des Moines Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 266 N.W.2d 118,
123, 128 (Iowa 1978).
96. The format of this chart is derived from that used in P. FEUILLE, supra note 59, at 47.
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fighters, and essential public safety employees. Only Iowa, Maine,
Nebraska, and Rhode Island provide compulsory arbitration for vir-
tually all public employees, and only Iowa, Maine, and Rhode Is-
land require compulsory arbitration for teachers upon impasse." It
is interesting to note that in Maine and Rhode Island any awards
involving money are advisory only. 8
The chart further shows that conventional arbitration is by far the
most popular form of arbitration. A number of jurisdictions, how-
ever, are experimenting with new ideas. For example, certain states
allow parties the option of choosing which form of arbitration to use.
Massachusetts recently amended its law to provide for a joint labor-
management committee to oversee police and firefighter negotia-
tions, the purpose of which is to encourage collective bargaining and
discourage resort to the impasse procedures." Composed of repre-
sentatives from both parties and a neutral chairman, the committee
is empowered to determine whether a true deadlock in negotiations
has occurred and, if so, what form of arbitration should be employed
to resolve the impasse.
CONCLUSION
Bargaining collectively over terms and conditions of employment,
like all forms of negotiation, cannot work when one of the parties to
the negotiation is also the final decisionmaker. Florida has enacted
a scheme that gives public employees rights to organize, to be free
from unfair labor practices, and to submit grievances to arbitration.
It has, however, denied them the right to bargain meaningfully over
the terms of their contract-a right so fundamental to collective
bargaining that its impairment compels a declaration that chapter
447 is unconstitutional.
An action seeking a declaration that the impasse resolution provi-
sions of chapter 447 violate the Florida Constitution is now pending
before a Broward County trial court. 00 This suit provides the judici-
97. Presumably, in states that permit rather than mandate arbitration, a number of local
governments and school districts have opted to employ compulsory interest arbitration. It
would generally be provided for by charter, ordinance, executive order, or contract. See, e.g.,
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS Ch. 13-A (1973),
reprinted in State and Local Programs: Maryland, 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 2911,
2923-29 (May 5, 1975).
98. See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 89.11(d) (Supp. 1978) (providing that arbitral awards
items requiring any monies for implementation are subject to appropriations); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 1101.805 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (providing that arbitral awards involving correctional
officers and court employees requiring legislative action are advisory only).
99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 4A (West Supp. 1979).
100. Broward County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. School Bd., No. 79-9435 (Fla. 17th Cir.
Ct., complaint filed May 25, 1979).
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ary with an opportunity to determine whether a statute that under-
mines a constitutional right will be allowed to stand. Although Flor-
ida courts should, and do, pay great deference to legislative imple-
mentation of constitutional provisions,'01 the courts have in the past
been willing to act when the implementation is ineffectual. Such is
the case here, and the courts should be bold in declaring the statute
unconstitutional.
Compulsory interest arbitration has not been free from criticism.
Neither party in arbitration is entirely comfortable being bound by
the decisions of an outsider. One must remember, however, that the
principal purpose of compulsory arbitration is to stand as a
threat-the way strikes stand as a threat-to pressure labor and
management to negotiate together voluntarily, in good faith, so that
resort need not invariably be made to impasse resolution mecha-
nisms. It should not be allowed to chill fruitful contract negotiation;
it should not become an automatic step in the bargaining process.
Final offer and issue-by-issue arbitration have been specifically
designed to maximize good faith bargaining, for both parties stand
to lose if their offers have not been reduced to the most reasonable
denominator. Combined with this, the flexibility potential in issue-
by-issue arbitration makes it the most desirable form of compulsory
arbitration. Florida should adopt it, specifying that each issue be
submitted by broad category rather than by minute points. Addi-
tionally, in order to ensure that arbitration is not perceived by labor
and management as a substitute for bargaining, Florida should
carefully scrutinize the aforementioned joint labor-management
committee being tested in Massachusetts and, if it appears practi-
cable and effective, create a similar committee.
Arbitration will not be warmly embraced in Florida, just as collec-
tive bargaining was not. The Florida Constitution, however, grants
citizens the right to collectively bargain, and that right cannot be
exercised fully unless employees share with their employers the
right to determine terms and conditions of employment; under the
present system, public employees do not share this right with their
employers. Public employee collective bargaining in Florida is
meaningless. If the legislature does not voluntarily amend chapter
447 to adequately implement this constitutional right, the courts
must act to force effective implementation.
101. E.g., District 57, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 352 So. 2d 62
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (the court acknowledged that farmworkers had a constitutional
right to collectively bargain, but said that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, was the
appropriate branch of government to grant relief).
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